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of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
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-vs.-
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a Utah Corporation, 
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Appeal From the Judgment of tlm ' 
Third District Court for Salt Lake COid 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. SEAL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
CARPETS, INCORPORATED, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 
10333 
KIND OF CASE WITH DISPOSITION 
IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent agrees with appellant's Statement of 
Kind of Case and the Disposition Before the Trial Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent agrees with appellant's Relief Sought 
on Avpeal excPpt it omitted the fact that plaintiff has 
('l'Oss-appt~aled in this case (R138) to attack the offset 
to his claim allowed in the lower conrt and seeks to have 
the jndgmL'nt amended accordingly. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The testimony of ~William Thompson ref erred to in 
respondent's Statement of Facts was actually a non-
responsive volunteer, self-serving declaration made dur- 1 
ing the course of voir dire examination after a motion 
to strike similar testimony regarding a written guaran-
tee as not being the best evidence ( R20). Even if it 
qualifies as evidence in such a state of the record, the 
testimony with respect thereto contended that the partic-
ular guarantee was seen by Mr. Sorensen of United 
Homes and David ':Vest, his attorney (R23), and that 
its form was a standard written form but neither of said 
persons nor any written form were produced to corro-
borate this secondary source of evidence although the 
need to fortify it was recognized by the production of 
Claude Thompson, defendant's president (R88). 
Respondent's claim that Exhibits D4 and D5 were 
received for the limited purpose of proving defects is 
entirely without support in the record for the court 
clearly explained it was receiving the same solely to 
complete the record for appeal on the issue of late 
delivery only. In addition, Exhibits D4 and D5 do not 
relate to defects (the word used is quality), and, in fact, 
nppeJlant-defondant did not even offer them for the 
proof of defects hut as to the quality of the carpet (R29). 
In addition to the testimony of Clifford Heaps re-
ferrl'd to in defrndant's brief, he~ also testified that the 
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"fuzzing" he saw would not per se indicate any defects 
(1U23). He was the only independent carpet expert who 
testified in this case. Victor carpet is a continuous fila-
ment nylon. If there was pilling in a continuous filament 
it would be defective. The pilling here was not Victor 
carpet (R128) and there is no proof that the quality 
carpet ordered and paid for in the apartment where there 
was pilling was continuous filament carpet. If the car-
pet sold were not continuous filament carpet, the "pill-
ing" is no indication of its being defective. Some of this 
carpet was the cheapest nylon carpet made (RlOl). 
Defendant's brief assumes and implies that the "car-
pet in issue" is all the same quality. This is not the fact. 
Both Mr. Witherell, President of plaintiff's assignor, 
and Clifford Heaps, the independent carpet expert, testi-
fied that the quality was not uniform (RlOl and 122 
respectively). 
No proffer on the issue of damages to the business 
was made by appellant-defendant as claimed by it on 
Page 16. 
A(l). THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
SUSTAINED OBJECTIONS TO THE IN-
TRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE AS TO DE-
L IVERY, AN ISSUE NOT RAISED IN THE 
PLEADINGS OR THE PRETRIAL ORDER. 
Appellant-defendant contends now on Page lB of its 
hrirf tJwt 110th the issncs of timely del'.\ r';·y an1 th0 
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quality of the carpet were contained in its Answer (R-2 
and R-3) and, in particular, implies that such were in. 
herent in its claim for damages for future business and 
customer good wm. Respondent-plaintiff submits that 
neither issue was raised in the Ans·wer of appellant-
defendant and the issue of tinwly d<:>livery was not within 
the issue framed by the Pretrial OrdE~r (R-4), which 
was sol<:>ly the issue of whether the carpet sold in this 
case \ms defective, the only issue raised by appellant-
(ldt>nclant's pleadin~. Appellant-defendant impliedly ac-
b10wlcdged this hy stating it 'rnuld like to amend its 
Am;wer aHPr the trial court properly ruled that a claim 
of "defective carpet" did not <:>ncompass the issue of 
whether it was delivered timely (R28). 
The appellant-defendant did not make a formal mo-
tion to amend its pleading or the Pretrial Order and 
does not urge that the denial of any such motion was an 
error. Had such a motion been made, it would be within 
the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny it, but 
the denial of it certainly would have been proper and 
not an ahuse of discretion since the ·witnesses respondent-
plaintiff would need to rrn~et such issue would have to 
come out of state and could not have been produced on 
tlw day its other witness had come from ont of state 
for this trial. 
A(2). THE TRIAL C01TRT DID NOT 
EXCLPDE ANY EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO 
LORS OF BLTSINESS AND F U T 1T R 1~ 
PROFITS. 
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On this issue the court sustained respondent-plain-
tiff's objections to a question calling for an answer as 
to what was "possible" after the answer was in that it 
1rns "very possible." (R36) The answer is immaterial 
hut it was not striken and is in evidence for what it is 
worth. The appellant-defendant apparently assumed 
that the trial court would not allow any further evidence 
of a speculative nature, which was probably a correct 
a:,sumption, but there is nothing in the record that indi-
cates the court excluded any evidence on this issue, in-
elnding the above, and the appellant-defendant's asser-
tion on Page 16 of its brief that there vrns a proffer on 
th;s point (which it implies was denied) is not correct. 
B. THE JUDGMENT DID CONFORM 
TO THE EVIDENCE EXCEPT TO THE EX-
TENT AN OFFSET WAS ALLOWED. 
Respondent-plaintiff agrees that the holding of this 
court in Seal v. Carpets, Inc., 13 Utah 2nd 147, 369 P 
2d 493, to the effect that the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed if it is supported by legally sufficient 
evidence canvassed favorably to the prevailing party 
se1s forth the legal principle to be applied in this case. 
Because this appellant-defendant prevailed in that case 
wlwre the defects were admitted and the only issue was 
thP darnagrs to off set against the seller's claim is cer-
tain 1~v no reason for it to do so here since the facts are 
not only totally different, as acknmYledged by appellant, 
hut .. in a<ldition, this party cfol not prevail in the trial 
eonrt in this case. HrncP, appellant's snrv0y of the 
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PvidPnCC' in this cas<> most favorable to thC' party which 
did not prevail is directly oppositP to the approach di-
r<1ctPd h~- th0 cited case which appellant urgPs should 
eontrol. 
Th(1 Pvidl'nce viewed most favorably to res11ondent 
:rnstains the finding that the carpeting here was not 
defective. The only inde>pendent expert on carpets who 
testifie>d ·was Clifford Heaps. He testified that it was 
not defective (Rl22). Such evidence was ample, suffi-
cient, substantial, competent and believable and sup-
ported the main conclusion and judgment of the court 
in this case. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the main prob-
lem with this case has been the confusion of three legal 
theories advanced by appellant at trial in addition to the 
one on which the issues were framed and the case tried 
and the acceptance in part by the court of one of those 
theories in reaching its decision. Specifically, the casP 
was pleaded and the issues framed at pretrial on the 
sole theory of allegedly defective carpeting (technically 
an alleged breach of express or implied warranty as to 
merchantability or general fitness). At trial, appellant-
def endant expressly urged the allowance of an offset on 
the additional grounds of ( 1) late delivery (technically 
a partial failurP of considerations for improper perform-
micP), and impliedly for (2) liability under a guaranter 
rr'~n1·r1inp; woar <'XCPpt on stairways, and (3) breach of 
wc:n:<;1t~- nf ennr1s11ond(11w<1 of goods sold to th0 sarnplr. 
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'rhe court expressly excluded evidence on (1) as dis-
eussed above. As to ( 2), it expressly found there was 
no written guarantee as to vvear (R137). The court 
hased its allowance of any offset solely on the theory 
of (3) as to the carpeting in the "easterly apartment" 
hut, in the absence of any proof as to the difference in 
vahw, used the amount of the entire discount defendant 
allowed to its custor:1er which apparently was based 
mainly on the delay in appellant-defendant's perform-
ance (Ex. D5), which would relate to theory (1) above, 
which was rejected by the court. 
To the extent that the court found that none of the 
carpet was defective (the trial court's Further Memo-
randum of Decision, which was prepared by the court, 
clearly so states and superseded the prior Findings of 
Fact submitted by plaintiff's counsel - on the mistaken 
assumption that the offset must be based on the sole 
issue framed and tried), the evidence clearly is sufficient 
to support it. 
C. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
AN OFFSET OF $1,625.00. 
Unless a judgment is sufficiently supported by the 
PVi<l<•nce, it should not be upheld on appeal. Respondent-
plrtintiff has cross - appealed on the grounds that the 
ofr'set allowed in this judgment does not have a suffi-
( iPnt legal basis in the evidence. 
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Aside from the procedural objection to allowing an 
off set on a basis other than the issues of the case and 
accepting the most favorable view of the conclusions of 
Claude Thompson with respect to "Sunday Samples," 
the evidence is devoid of any proof as to appellant-de-
f endant's damages as a result, as the trial court pointed 
out in its Further Memorandum Decision (R136). First, 
because there was no proof as to either the amount of 
carpet involved (the court found only the easterly apart-
ment carpet was of inferior quality); second, because 
there was no proof as to the difference in value between 
that portion of the carpet purchased and that portion 
of the carpet received. The burden of proof as to dam-
ages as well as to liability to sustain any offset rested 
upon appellant-defendant and it failed to sustain its 
burden. 
rrhis case seems indicative of a trend for purchasers 
to hny on the basis of price and, if the merchandise does 
not satisfy as ·well as that of a higher quality and cor-
rc•sponding price, to allege and seek to prove it must 
have been defective. It's perhaps natural for a judge 
tn w::>.nt to do s~m1ething for both sides (usually there are 
t-,,-o sides to a story), hut respondent submits justice is 
not done when any available fignn• is nstid as a suhsti-
tute for legal proof. If necessity required it in the 
interPst of justice, it is submitted that the figure of 
~':_::/()CO (E.~d1ihit P-9) wonld lw mon• logiral. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be amended 
t" 01irninate the offset or, at least, to reduce it to $270.00 
nnd to affirm the judgment as so modified. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
HANSEN & SUMSION 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant. 
